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TAX COLLECTION-WHERE ONE CODEPOSITOR IN A JOINT
BANK ACCOUNT FAILS TO PAY FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MAY LEVY ON THE ACCOUNT WITHOUT NOTICE TO INNOCENT CODEPOSITORS,
PROVIDED THE DELINQUENT TAXPAYER HAS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT UNDER STATE LAW TO WITHDRAW FUNDS
FROM THE JOINT ACCOUNT. United States v. National Bank of
Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985).
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) assessed an Arkansas resident
for federal income taxes, penalties, and interest. 1 The delinquent taxpayer shared a checking account and savings account with his wife and
his mother at an Arkansas bank. The contract with the bank authorized
all three to make withdrawals from either account. Pursuant to section
6331 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), the IRS served a notice of
levy on the bank demanding payment of the unpaid taxes. 2 The bank
refused to comply with the levy because it could not identify which portion of deposited money belonged to the delinquent taxpayer and which
to the other codepositors. 3 The United States brought an action seeking
judgment against the bank under section 6332 of the Code for the
amount of the assessment. 4
1. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2922 (1985). The
taxpayer was assessed a total amount of $3,607.45. As a result of payments and
credits, the amount owing was reduced to $856.61. Id.
2. Jd. at 2922. I.R.C. § 6331 (1982) provides:
LEVY AND DISTRAINT.
(a) Authority of Secretary-If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be
lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall
be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property
and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under§ 6334)
belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for payment of such tax.
(b) Seizure and Sale of Property -The term "levy" as used in this title
includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)(3), a levy shall extend only to property
possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof. In any case in which
the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize
and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal,
tangible or intangible).
I.R.C. § 6331 (1982).
3. National Bank, lOS S. Ct. at 2922.
4. Id. The text of I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982) provides in part:
SURRENDER OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEVY.
(a) Requirement -(A]ny person in possession of (or obligated with respect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy
has been made shall, upon demand of the Secretary, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to the Secretary, except such
part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject to
an attachment or execution under any judicial process.
I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982). A bank which refuses to comply with an IRS notice oflevy
and demand for payment may be subject to a penalty of 50% of the amount sought
by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6332(c)(2) (1982). In deciding whether to impose a penalty, lower courts have considered whether there exists a bona fide dispute to the
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted the bank's motion to dismiss, holding that the IRS failed to
meet minimum procedural due process requirements. 5 The court held
that the IRS must identify and notify the codepositors, and provide them
with an opportunity to be heard. 6 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 7 but not upon constitutional grounds.
Relying on principles of statutory construction, the court held that
before a levy is permitted the IRS must determine the actual value of the
taxpayer's interest in the joint account to demonstrate that the bank is in
possession of property belonging to the taxpayer. 8 The court ruled that
the IRS could not prevail without negating or quantifying the claims of
the codepositors. 9 On certiorari, a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed.10 The majority recognized that the taxpayer's absolute right
under state law to withdraw funds deposited in the joint accounts created
"property or rights to property" within the meaning of section 6321 of
the Code. 11 Consequently, the accounts in their entirety were subject to
administrative levy.12
The United States Constitution provides the federal government
with the authority to levy and collect taxes. 13 Pursuant to this general
authority, the United States Congress enacted a statute in 1791 authorizing the seizure and sale of property owned by manufacturers of distilled
spirits who failed to pay excise taxes. 14 Similar legislation permitted the
seizure and sale of property whose owners failed to pay property tax 15

5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

property such that the bank acted with good cause in refusing payment. See United
States v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y., 494 F.2d 919 (2nd Cir. 1974);
United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). If a bank does comply with a notice of levy and demand
for payment by the IRS, the bank is not liable to the depositors in the accounts.
Compliance with IRS demands is an absolute defense from any action against the
bank by the depositors. See Sebel v. Lytton Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 65-1 USTC 11
9343 (S.D. Cal. 1965).
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
Id.
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984).
Jd. at 1293. The court acknowledged that the taxpayer could have withdrawn any
amount he wished from the account and used it to pay his debts, including his
unpaid taxes, but rejected the government's contention that the IRS stood in the
shoes of the taxpayer and could act as he could with respect to the accounts. I d. at
1295-96.
ld.
United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919 (1985) (5-4 decision).
Jd. at 2926.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and
Excises shall be unifoim throughout the United States."
1 Stat. 199, 204 (1791). See also 3 Stat. 152, 154 (1814) (reenacting a similar
statute).
3 Stat. 164, 173 (1815).
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and permitted the seizure and sale of goods from manufacturers who
failed to pay tax upon those goods. 16 The present federal tax lien statute
is codified in section 6321 of the Code and resembles the first federal tax
lien statute 17 enacted by Congress in 1865, 18 which was amended in
1866. 19
Under section 6321 of the Code, a tax lien arises in favor of the
United States when a taxpayer fails to pay any tax owed to the federal
government. 20 Although the lien attaches to all property or rights to
property belonging to the taxpayer, 21 it does not contain an enforcement
provision. The IRS must take affirmative action under one of two Code
sections to collect the unpaid taxes. 22 Section 7403 authorizes the IRS to
institute a lien foreclosure suit, 23 and section 6331 empowers the IRS to
16. 3 Stat. 180, 182 (1815).
17. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). See Oppenheim, Federal Tax Liens: Evolution and Conflict
with State Liens, 4 DuQ. L. REv. 495, 496 (1965-66).
18. 13 Stat. 469, 470 (1865). This statute was an amendment to a statute enacted in
1864. The 1864 statute provided for distraint of property, but did not impose a lien
on the property. See 13 Stat. 223, 233 (1864). See generally Kennedy, The Relative
Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 919-20 (1954) (indicating a reason for the enactment of
the first tax lien: "The need for a lien to secure the Government's tax claims, irrespective of the taxpayer's solvency, became apparent as federal fiscal requirements
expanded during the Civil War and tax collections were increasingly defeated by a
transfer of the taxpayer's assets before institution of enforcement proceedings.").
19. 14 Stat. 98, 107 (1866). This statute was an amendment to both the statute in 1864
and its amendment in 1865. See supra note 18. It provided that if any person was
liable to pay tax and, after notice refused:
[T]he amount shall be a lien in favor of the United States from the time it
was due until paid, with the interest, penalties, and costs that may accrue
in addition thereto, upon all property and rights to property belonging to
such person ... and the collector, after demand, may levy, and by warrant
may authorize a deputy collector to levy upon all property and rights to
property belonging to such person . . . .
14 Stat. at 107.
20. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). The statute provides:
LIEN FOR TAXES.
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition
to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in
addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, belonging to such person.
I.R.C. § 6321 (1982). See also Oppenheim supra note 17, at 496 ("[B]efore a federal
tax lien arises, three conditions must be fullfilled. There must be an assessment, a
demand, and a neglect or refusal to pay tax.").
21. Id.
22. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 682 (1983).
23. I.R.C. § 7403 (1982) provides in part:
ACTION TO ENFORCE LIEN OR TO SUBJECT PROPERTY TO
PAYMENT OF TAX.
(a) Filing- In any case where there has been a refusal or neglect to pay
any tax or to discharge any liability in respect thereof, whether or not levy
has been made, the Attorney General or his delegate, at the request of the
Secretary, may direct a civil action to be filed in a district court of the
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employ an administrative levy. 24 Both procedures ensure the prompt
and certain enforcement of the tax laws, 25 but differ in their treatment of
third parties who have a joint interest in the delinquent taxpayer's
property. 26
Under the lien foreclosure suit, the court is authorized to seize and
sell a delinquent taxpayer's property to satisfy a tax debt. 27 All persons
with an interest in the seized property must be made parties to the suit. 28
The court is empowered to determine the merits of the claims of all parties involved, order the sale of such property, and provide for the proper
distribution of the proceeds of the sale. 29 The lien foreclosure suit protects third parties with an interest in the property from an unsuspected
lien on the property by the IRS. The lien foreclosure action also benefits
the IRS by providing the highest ·return possible on the forced sale of
seized property. 3o
Under the administrative levy, the IRS may seize and sell a delinquent taxpayer's property to satisfy a tax debt.3 1 The IRS must notify
the delinquent taxpayer of the tax liability and demand payment. 32 Ten
days after notification, the IRS can levy all property owned by the taxpayer whether or not that property is owned jointly with a third party. 33
If the property is in the possession of a third party, then the third party

24.

25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

United States to enforce the lien of the United States under this title with
respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, of whatever
nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to
the payment of such tax or liability.
(b) Parties- All persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the
property involved in such action shall be made parties thereto.
(c) Adjudication and decree- The court shall, after the parties have been
duly notified of the action, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved
therein and finally determine the merits of all claims to and liens upon the
property, and, in all cases where a claim or interest of the United States
therein is established, may decree a sale of such property, by the proper
officer of the court, and a distribution of the proceeds of such sales according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and
of the United States.
I.R.C. § 7403 (1982).
For the text of I.R.C. § 6331 (1982), see supra note 2. There are a number of exemptions listed in § 6334 of the Code which describe property upon which a levy
cannot attach. These exemptions are basically necessaries, which include clothing,
books, personal effects, unemployment benefits, undelivered mail, pensions, workmen's compensation, and child support payments. I.R.C. § 6334 (1982).
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 683.
A third method of collecting unpaid taxes available to the IRS is a common law
creditor action which gives the IRS the rights of a judgment creditor. This note
does not discuss the rights of the federal government as an ordinary judgment
creditor.
I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982). See supra note 23.
I.R.C. § 7403(b) (1982).
I.R.C. § 7403(c) (1982).
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 699.
I.R.C. § 6331(b) (1982).
I.R.C. § 6331(d)(l) (1982).
I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 6332(a) (1982). See supra notes 2 and 4.
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must surrender the property to the IRS upon demand. 34 In contrast to
the lien foreclosure suit, the administrative levy does not require judicial
intervention, 35 nor does it require notice to anyone with an interest in the
property other than the delinquent taxpayer. Although the administrative levy provides the IRS with a quick and inexpensive device for collecting federal taxes, 36 it leaves third parties with an interest in the levied
property with the burden of protecting their ownership interests in postseizure actions. 37
Before the IRS can avail itself of either the lien foreclosure suit or
the administrative levy, there must be a federal tax lien upon the taxpayer's property. 38 A lien may only attach to property owned by the
taxpayer. 39 Thus, regardless of the remedy pursued by the IRS, the
threshold question is whether and to what extent the taxpayer has property or rights to property.
In United States v. Bess, 40 the United States Supreme Court considered whether the IRS could impose an administrative levy upon the proceeds of life insurance policies. 41 The Court held that the IRS could not
attach the proceeds of the insurance policies, but that it could recover the
cash surrender value of the policies. 42 The Court stated that the Code
does not create property rights, but merely attaches federally defined
consequences to property rights created by state law. 43 Under state law
the taxpayer in Bess had no right to the proceeds of the policies, but he
could have compelled payment of the cash surrender value of the policies.44 The Court concluded that the taxpayer's right to the cash surrender value of the policies constituted property or rights to property which
was subject to seizure under an administrative levy. 45 The beneficiary
argued that the IRS could not levy even on the cash surrender value of
the policy because the proceeds of the policy were beyond the reach of a
creditor's lien under state law. 46 The Court rejected this argument, holding that state law cannot prevent the operation of a federal tax lien once a
property right is determined. 47 The Court also noted that property not
expressly exempted from the operation of a federal tax lien by the Code48
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

I.R.C. § 6332(a) (1982). See supra note 4.
Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 682-83.
/d. at 699.
I.R.C. §§ 6343, 7426 (1982). See infra note 68.
I.R.C. §§ 6331(a), 7403(a) (1982).
I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
357 u.s. 51 (1958).
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 52 (1958). The estate reduced the indebtedness
to approximately $9,000. /d.
/d. at 55-57.
/d. at 55.
/d. at 56.
/d.
/d.
/d. at 56-57.
/d. at 57. For a list of exempted property, see supra note 24.
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could not be judicially exempted. 49
Two years later, in Aquilino v. United States, 50 the Court articulated
the respective roles of state and federal law. The Court emphasized that
in cases involving federal tax liens the first issue is whether the taxpayer
has property or rights to property upon which a lien can attach. 51 This
issue is determined according to state law because of the "legitimate and
traditional interest which the state has in creating and defining the property interests of its citizens." 52 Once a property interest is found, the
Court stated that state law is no longer applicable. The application of
federal law to property interests created by state law ensures "a uniform
administration of the federal revenue statutes." 53
Neither Bess nor Aquilino determined whether a federal tax lien
could attach to jointly held property to satisfy the tax debt of one of the
joint owners. In Babb v. Schmidt, 54 the Ninth Circuit upheld the use of
an administrative levy upon joint bank accounts belonging to a husband
and a wife to satisfy the tax obligations of the husband. 55 The Third
Circuit earlier had reached a contrary result in Raffaele v. Granger. 56 In
Raffaele, the court focused not on whether the codepositor had the right
to withdraw the full amount of the bank accounts, but rather on whether,
under state law, the accounts which are owned jointly by a husband and
wife are considered to be held in tenancy by the entireties and therefore
49. /d. See also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971) (stating in regard to
the language of the exception provision of § 6334: "This language is specific and it
is clear and there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens
to be exempt from state levy under state law.").
50. 363 u.s. 509 (1960).
51. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512 (1960).
52. /d. at 514.
53. /d. The Court considered whether an IRS administrative tax levy on the property
interest of a general contractor in a construction contract had priority over a
mechanic's lien against the contract filed by subcontractor. /d. at 510-22. The subcontractor argued that under New York law the amount due to the general contractor from the owner constituted "trust funds" in the hands of the general contractor
for the benefit of subcontractors, laborers, and materialmen and that the general
contractor thus had no property rights in the fund to which the IRS's levy could
attach. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the IRS and the Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment because the Court of Appeals of New York had not determined clearly what
property or rights to property the general contractor had in the fund under state
law. /d. at 515-16. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals of New
York for a determination of the nature of property interests of the general contractor in the fund. /d. at 513-14.
54. 496 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1974).
55. /d. at 959. The court did not focus on whether the husband had any property or
rights to property in the accounts under state law, but rather on whether the wife's
property could be used to satisfy the husband's debts under state law.
Other cases have held that a joint bank account may be levied to satisfy taxes
owed by one codepositor. See, e.g., Riollano v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 197 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 111 F. Supp. 152 (M.D. Pa. 1953); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 49
A.F.T.R.2d ~ 82-484 (D. Md. 1981).
56. 196 F.2d 620 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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not subject to creditors' claims. 57 The court determined that, under
Pennsylvania law, a joint bank account was a "single personality" which
was not subject to attachment by creditors of one of the codepositors. 58
Expressing concern that the IRS was attempting to take property belonging to one person to satisfy the tax obligation of another, 5 9 the court held
that a tax levy upon a joint bank account was not permitted. 60 Similar
concern for the rights of nondeliquent codepositors led the Eighth Circuit to deny the IRS the right to levy the joint accounts in United States
v. National Bank of Commerce. 6l
On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts. 62 Consistent with Bess and Aquilino, the Court found that the
taxpayer's absolute right under state law to withdraw funds from the
accounts created property or rights to property in the entire account. 63
The Court held that upon the tax default of one codepositor, 64 the joint
accounts were subject to federal .tax lien provisions without proof that
the delinquent taxpayer had complete ownership of the accounts. 65 The
Court also held that the IRS was not required to provide notice of the tax
lien to the codepositors because under the administrative levy there is no
57. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620, 622 (3rd Cir. 1952). The court's focus in Raffaele was misplaced. The issue was not whether the property was subject to creditors' claims under state law, but rather whether the taxpayer had property or rights
to property in the bank account. Because the taxpayer did have the right to withdraw money from this account, he had a right to property in the account under state
law. Once it is determined that the taxpayer has a property right under state law,
state law consequences become irrelevant and federal law controls as to tax consequences. The property should have been subject to the federal tax lien. See supra
notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
58. Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 622.
59. /d. at 623. Even courts which have allowed the use of a federal tax lien upon jointly
held property have demonstrated concern for the rights of the nondelinquent codepositor. These courts have gone to great lengths to justify the lien instead of simply
determining whether the delinquent taxpayer had property or rights to property in
the property seized. See, e.g., United States v. Millikin, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
~ 9641 (M.D.N.C. 1962) (After determining that the husband was the sole source of
the funds used to purchase the bonds, the court held that United States savings
bonds owned jointly by a husband, wife, and their daughter were subject to levy to
satisfy the husband's tax debts.).
60. 196 F.2d at 622-23.
61. 726 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1984).
62. United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 105 S. Ct. 2919, 2927 (1985).
63. /d. at 2926.
64. /d. at 2927, 2931. The right of the codepositor-taxpayer to withdraw the full
amount in the joint accounts was based on the taxpayer's contract with the bank
and on an Arkansas statute. /d. at 2926. Under Arkansas law, a bank account is
not subject to creditor's liens. /d. at 2925-26. As in Bess and Aquilino, however,
state law exemptions are inoperable once the court determines that the taxpayer has
property or rights to property in the accounts. /d. at 2927-28. Thus, the Court in
National Bank indicated that the lower courts had applied state law inappropriately.
/d. at 2927. Once state law defines the nature of the interest which the taxpayer has
in the property, federal law dictates the tax consequences to the state law right. /d.
at 2928.
65. /d. at 2927.
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requirement of notice to the innocent codepositor. 66
The Court addressed the lower courts' concern for the third parties
who share in the ownership of joint accounts and whose interest might be
affected by a tax lien. 67 The Court noted that Congress has provided
remedies for third parties seeking to protect their property interests. 68
The Court deferred to the congressional scheme, stating that Congress
had balanced the government's interest in the prompt collection of taxes
against the claimant's interest in the property. 69 Congress reconciled
these interests by permitting the IRS to levy on the property immediately, leaving disputes over ownership to be resolved in post-seizure ad66. ld. at 2926. The Court noted that a bank's only two possible defenses for refusal to
comply with a demand for payment by the IRS are that the property is subject to
prior judicial attachment or that the bank is not in possession of the property subject to the tax lien. ld. at 2925.
67. Id. at 2928.
68. ld. at 2928. One remedy is to seek an administrative review within nine months of
the date of the notice of levy. I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6343-1(b)(2) (1984). I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982) provides:
Authority to release levy and return property
(a) Release of Levy- It shall be lawful for the Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, to release the levy upon all or part of the
property or rights to property levied upon where the Secretary determines
that such action will facilitate the collection of the liability, but such release shall not operate to prevent any subsequent levy.
(b) Return of Property - If the Secretary determines that property has
been wrongfully levied upon, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to
return( I) the specific property levied upon,
(2) an amount of money equal to the amount of money levied upon,
or
(3) an amount of money equal to the amount of money received by
the United States from the sale of such property.
Property may be returned at any time. An amount equal to the amount of
money levied upon or received from such sale may be returned at any time
before the expiration of 9 months of the date of such levy . . . .
(c) Interest shall be allowed and paid at an annual rate established under
section 6621 ....
I.R.C. § 6343(b) (1982). A second remedy is that a party claiming an interest in
property may bring a civil action against the United States to have the property
returned. I.R.C. § 7426 (1982). This section reads in part:
Civil actions by persons other than taxpayers
(a) Actions permitted(1) Wrongful levy - If a levy has been made on property or property
has been sold pursuant to a levy, any person (other than the
person against whom is assessed the tax out of which such levy
arose) who claims an interest in or lien on such property and
that such property was wrongfully levied upon may bring a civil
action against the United States in a district court of the United
States. Such action may be brought without regard to other
such property which has been surrendered to or sold by the Secretary ....
I.R.C. § 7426 (1982).
69. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2929.
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ministrative or judicial proceedings. 7 ° Finally, the Court reasoned that if
the IRS were required to notify third parties and include them in collection proceedings, there would be no practical distinction between the administrative levy and the lien foreclosure suit. 71
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by three other justices, argued that both prior decisions and the rights of third parties compelled a decision against the IRS. 72 In comparing the lien foreclosure
suit and the administrative levy, the dissent urged that only the lien foreclosure suit permitted the IRS to seize property in which a delinquent
taxpayer had a partial interest. 73 In contrast, the administrative levy
could be employed only where the taxpayer had full ownership of the
property levied. 74 The dissent concluded that the levy in this case was
improper because the IRS did not demonstrate that the bank held property "completely" belonging to the delinquent taxpayer. 75
70. /d.
71. /d. at 2931. The Court noted that such a rule could eliminate the use of the administrative levy altogether. ld. The Supreme Court did not address the constitutional
issues concerning notice to third parties, but noted that the parties were free to
address this issue on remand. /d. at 2929 n.12. On remand, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the levy against the bank, and remanded
the case to the district court to resolve the issue of notice. United States v. National
Bank of Commerce, 772 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1985). On remand, the case was dismissed as moot because the tax debt had been paid. United States v. National Bank
of Commerce, 775 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1985). Therefore, whether notice must be
given to nondelinquent codepositors of joint bank accounts is unresolved.
The statutory post-seizure remedies may satisfy due process. The Court has
stated that "[t]he fundamental requirement ofdue process is the opportunity to be
heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner'." Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
In Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), the Court demonstrated that remedies which are available after the seizure of property can comport with due process
mandates. In Phillips, the government assessed taxes and penalties against the
shareholders in a dissolved corporation and utilized administrative proceedings to
collect the taxes. /d. at 595. The Court noted that where property rights alone are
involved, postponement of the judicial inquiry does not deny due process if the opportunity for the ultimate judicial determination of the liability is adequate. /d. at
596-97. National Bank implies that the post-seizure remedies are adequate. See
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Although National Bank and Phillips
indicate that the post-seizure remedies available to third parties may be sufficient to
meet due process requirements neither address the issue of notice, and the facts in
Phillips did not involve third parties.
72. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2932 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. /d. at 2933.
74. /d.
75. /d. at 2935. The majority rejected this contention by asserting that the word "completely" is not part of the statute. /d. at 2929-30 n.14. Further, the majority stated
that "collection provisions plainly contemplate that a taxpayer's interest in the
property may be less than full ownership. The tax lien attaches not only to 'property', but also to 'rights to property'." /d. at 2929-30.
The dissent relied upon Mansfield v. Excelsior Refining Co., 135 U.S. 326
(1890), and United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677 (1983), to support the proposition that only property completely belonging to a delinquent taxpayer may be subject to an administrative levy. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2932-35 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). These cases were distinguished by the majority. /d. at 2930 n.15.
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Like the majority, the dissent looked to state law to determine the
nature of the delinquent taxpayer's interests in the property seized. The
dissent found that under state law the taxpayer legally could not possess
the funds of others, 76 and that the right to withdraw all of the funds from
the accounts was not sufficient alone as a basis for allowing an administrative levy. 77 The dissent reasoned that the majority's holding permits
the IRS to levy on a joint account even though it knew that under state
law the funds in the joint account did not belong to the delinquent
taxpayer. 78
National Bank supports the legitimate interest of the government in
the enforcement of its tax laws. It is also consistent with the Court's
prior decisions in Bess 19 and Aquilino. 80 The Court in National Bank,
however, failed to carefully consider the adverse impact on the nondelinquent codepositor of a joint bank account. 81 The Court stated that the
administrative levy, unlike a lien foreclosure suit, does not implicate the
rights of third parties. 82 This conclusion assumes that third parties will
bring post-seizure actions. The innocent codepositor may not bring a
post-seizure action, however, for two reasons. First, the innocent codepositor may not know that the joint account has been seized because
there is no notice requirement to third parties under an administrative
levy. 83 Second, even if he were made aware of the levy, the innocent
codepositor may not pursue a post-seizure remedy because the loss incurred might be less than the anticipated expense of the remedy. Therefore, the majority's contention that third party rights are not implicated

76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Mansfield involved the use of a levy in which the court held that the government
may not levy upon a leasehold interest and then sell a fee interest. Id. at 2934
(Powell, J., dissenting). The majority asserted that this case stood for the proposition that the government cannot sell a totally different interest than it levied upon.
/d. at 2931 n.l5. Rodgers did not involve the use of the administrative levy, but
rather the lien foreclosure suit. /d. at 2930. Nevertheless, the Court contrasted the
two remedies and stated that the administrative levy does not require notice and
hearing to third parties because their rights are not intended to be implicated. Compare id. at 2934 (Powell, J., dissenting) with Rodgers, 461 U.S. at 696. The majority
stated that the decision in National Bank is consistent with Rodgers because the
administrative levy does not determine any rights to the property. It functions to
protect the government's interests so that rights to the property may be determined
in a post-seizure proceeding. National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2930.
National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2933 (Powell, J., dissenting).
/d. at 2935.
/d. at 2937-38 nn.9-10. The dissent also stated that the administrative levy could
hardly be characterized as provisional because the burden to bring postseizure actions is on third parties. Id. at 2938-39.
Another area of concern raised by the dissent was that the majority's holding
will be applicable to other forms of joint property. /d. at 2939. However, this concern was dispelled because the majority expressly stated that the holding is limited
to joint bank accounts. /d. at 2927, n.10.
357 U.S. 51 (1958). See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
363 U.S. 509 (1960). See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
National Bank, 105 S. Ct. at 2928-29.
/d. at 2930 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 696 (1983)).
Id. at 2930.
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is inaccurate insofar as it ignores the potential adverse effect to innocent
third parties.
The Court stated that third parties are not joined in administrative
levy proceedings, as they are in lien foreclosure suits, because joining
third parties in an administrative levy proceeding would be uneconomical. 84 This conclusion suggests that the administrative levy should be
used for the collection of small sums of unpaid taxes and the lien foreclosure suit for larger amounts. The Code does not limit the use of the
administrative levy to disputes involving relatively small monetary
amounts. 85 If the Court, or Congress, were to specify a maximum dollar
amount for administrative levy proceeqings, innocent third parties would
be protected from the danger of a government levy on large property
interests in actions where third parties would not be joined
automatically.
Maryland law is similar to Arkansas law in that a person who is a
party to a joint bank account may withdraw all of the funds in that account. 86 Therefore, a joint bank account in Maryland constitutes property or rights to property upon which a federal tax lien may attach. As in
National Bank, a joint bank account in Maryland may be seized by the
IRS without notification to an innocent codepositor.
National Bank affirms the importance of providing the IRS with an
effective, prompt, and stringent means of tax collection. 87 The Court's
holding that a bank account may be levied upon, even when jointly held,
is consistent with the scheme of the Internal Revenue Code to promote
the efficient collection of taxes. Although the government's compelling
interest in collecting taxes may be paramount to the rights of innocent
third parties who hold property jointly with delinquent taxpayers,
greater protection should be afforded such third parties to avoid potentially harsh results.

Stephen S. McCloskey
84. /d. at 2931.
85. In Rodgers, the IRS used a lien foreclosure suit for the collection of taxes owed in
the amount of $900,000.00. In National Bank, the IRS used an administrative levy
for the collection of $856.61. Although these cases indicate that the lien foreclosure
suit is used for large dollar amounts, it is unclear where the cutoff is. For example,
in United States v. Sterling Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y., 494 F.2d 919 (2nd Cir.
1974), the IRS used an administrative levy to seek collection of taxes owed in the
amount of $15,531.25.
86. See Haneke v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 98, 108 (D. Md. 1975); Scott v. Bowman, 253 Md. 55, 58, 251 A.2d 598, 599 (1969); Sody v. Sody, 32 Md. App. 644,
652-53, 363 A.2d 568, 573-74 (1976); United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 49
A.F.T.R.2d ~IT 82-428, 82-725 (D. Md. 1982). See also MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN.
§ 5-303 (1980) ("If a deposit in a banking institution is made in the names of two or
more persons and is payable to any one of them ... [t]he money in the account may
be withdrawn by any person named on the account .... ").
87. "[T]axes ·are the life blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability
an imperious need." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).

